§17

Contemporary philosophers have penetrated more deeply into the concept of the immortality of the soul and, by means of the light they have cast upon it, the efforts of the ancients either to defend it or take issue with it have been rendered fruitless. These philosophers have discovered that while the incorruptibility of the soul is without doubt a preliminary aspect of immortality, or can be regarded as a condition that must be presupposed for it, yet the notion of immortality also consists in completely different parts. One can say that more recent philosophers take immortality in a twofold sense, that is, either with a broader or a narrower scope. The first set such wide boundaries to immortality that it also takes into account those things that can be more appropriately reckoned to the consideration of the state of the soul after death. Among the first within this group to make this claim in his published writings is the late *Herr* Thümmig who distinguished four components of the notion of the immortality of the soul: its incorruptibility, its eternal duration after the death of the human being, the life of the soul in this state, and the recollection of its previous state.[5] There is nothing considerable to find fault with in this conception of immortality [...].

§21

If the human soul is considered on its own, without regarding it as an inhabitant and governor of the body with which it is united in this life, then one can divide its life into two parts: sensual (or animal) and spiritual life. The soul's life consists in the continuation of its nature,[6] and its nature consists in its faculties and powers, and these are either lower or higher; consequently, the sensual life of the soul consists in the continuation of all its sensual powers. The soul lives in the sensual sense as long as even a single, sensible representation, whether obscure or confused, is to be found in it, or as long as it generates even a single sensual appetite or aversion. The continuation of the higher powers of the soul constitutes its spiritual life, and this endures for as long as there is even only a single distinct representation, rational appetite or aversion in the soul. Anyone who is familiar with the nature of the human soul knows that it would be impossible for it to have a spiritual life without a sensual one. By contrast, the latter can take place without the first as already in this life we sometimes find ourselves in a state where the higher powers of the soul are completely inactive, such as in sleep (which I will consider further below). One should here be mindful that I take *spiritual* life in the philosophical sense without concerning myself with the theological signification of that word. On the other hand, there is clearly also a twofold sense to the death of the human soul: sensual and spiritual. The first robs the soul of all of its lower powers, after which it does not retain even a single sensual representation, appetite or aversion any more. The latter, however, is only the

[5] This is a reference to Wolff's student, Ludwig Philipp Thümmig (1697–1728), who offers an analysis of the notion of immortality in his dissertation *Demonstratio immortalitatis animae ex intima eius natura deducta* (published in his *Meletemata varii et rarioris argumenti* [Braunschwig and Leipzig, 1727], pp. 150–82); cf. especially §VI.

[6] On this, Meier is following Baumgarten; cf. *Metaphysica*, §780.